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Although the small market limits the number 
of competitors and the intensity of competition 
within most Indian industries, the textile industry 
remains an exception. It was, perhaps, more 
competitive 30 years ago, when a large number of 
mills produced undifferentiated yarn or grey 
cloth and sold it at prices over which they had 
little control. Today, there is greater product 
differentiation, but the number of competitors is 
greater and among them are groups (e.g .. 
powerlooms) between which collusion is pos-
sible. 
The intensity of competition is not reflected in 
the speed of adoption of innovations or their 
diffusion. New technology, embodied in equip-
ment. has been imported from abroad after 
considerable lags, although the lags have been 
shorter when the rate of investment has been 
high. The range of technologies in use at any 
point in time has also been great, largely because 
new investment has tended to go into new 
enterprises and old enterprises have been sheltered 
from competition by low depreciation costs. 
In general. a number of new elements were 
introduced during the postwar period. (I) With 
the separation of Pakistan, India lost some prime 
cotton-growing areas, a shortage of foreign 
exchange limited cotton imports, and the size and 
quality of domestic cotton output began to 
influence the growth of the textile industry, 
which has only recently been modified by the 
supply of man-made fibres. (2) Quantitative 
import restrictions led to the growth of a 
diversified textile machinery industry, which 
made equipment more widely and easily avail-
able than was the case prior to the 1950s. (3) The 
government discriminated against various seg-
ments of the industry both by fiscal means and 
through its control of productive capacity. The 
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discrimination was against mills, which, as a 
result. faced more intense competition. The 
purpose of this paper is to review the influence of 
these forces on the technology and market 
structure of the textile industry. 
It should be noted that virtually all of the 
available data refer to the mill sector and almost 
none to the small-scale sector. Hence, conclusions 
made about the latter are necessarily in the way of 
inferences, although they have a basis insofar as 
the small-scale sector buys its yarn from the mills. 
Another important point is that it is treacherous, 
in India, to judge the success of a firm or industry 
from its rate of profit. The taxation of declared 
profits creates a strong incentive to take profits in 
undeclared forms. There are, undoubtedly, some 
large corporations that are fair to shareholders 
and have a strong enough competitive position to 
make high declared profits even after tax, but in 
companies and other types of firms controlled by 
a family or a small group of people, profits are, to 
a great extent. distributed without being called 
profits. In the textile industry the rate of profit is 
doubly misleading because its capital equipment 
is old and, hence, valued at extremely low 
historical costs. If it were valued at replacement 
costs, a large part of the industry would be 
operating at a loss. Hence, the success of firms 
and groups is judged on the rate of growth of 
sales, based on the assumption that a firm would 
not be expanding if its owners found it unprofit-
able to do so. 
Cotton Textile Technology 
Cotton textile technology has three essential 
stages: cotton preparation, spinning, and weav-
ing. Preparation entails cleaning, straightening, 
and aligning the fibres; spinning involves draw-
ing out and twisting the fibres into a thread with 
some tensile strength; and weaving consists of 
stretching the threads and arranging them into a 
dense grid, which constitutes cloth. 
In the manual form, which can still be observed 
in khadi (handspun cloth) production in India, 
the preparation of cotton consists of three stages. 
Firstly, the cotton is ginned, i.e., cotton received 
from the field is passed between rollers that are 
too close together to allow the seeds to pass; in 
this way, the lint is separated from the seeds. The 
lint is then blown: a taut string passing through 
the cotton is beaten and as it springs up it throws 
up cotton tuffs that open out and shed dust and 
grit. In the third stage, the clean cotton is passed 
through rollers with teeth or knives that stretch 
out the fibres in a single direction, producing a 
pad of more or less even thickness. This pad, or 
lap, is then rolled into slivers. 
All of these stages are present in the mechan-
ized version of the technology as well. Blowing is 
accomplished using air jets but apart from that 
machine operations duplicate the manual pro-
cesses. The productivity of labour and equipment 
in the succeeding process, spinning, depends 
upon the quality of the sliver (or roving, as it is 
called in the mechanized version). Hence, as the 
speed of spinning increases, the preparatory 
processes become more elaborate and better 
controlled. 
In handspinning, the spinner draws out the 
sliver with one hand to thin it down and turns the 
spindle with the other to give the emerging yarn a 
twist. In the next movement, the yarn is wound 
onto the spindle. By varying the relative rates of 
drawing and twisting, the spinner can vary the 
thickness of the yarn: a skilled spinner can spin 
thinner and more even yarn with fewer breaks. 
Thus, the spinner's skill can compensate, to some 
extent, for the quality of the cotton as well as the 
preparation. In mechanized spinning, the twist-
ing of fibre into yarn as well as its winding onto 
the spindle are simultaneous operations carried 
out at a constant speed. Hence, the roving being 
fed into the ring frame must be more standard-
ized and homogenized than the sliver used on the 
spinning wheel. Open-end spinning machines, 
which have been introduced abroad within the 
last 15 years and which operate at higher speeds 
than ring frames, require even better processed 
cotton; in particular, they require cleaner raw 
material as well as a dust-free environment. 
In handweaving, the weaver uses one hand for 
shedding, i.e., for raising and lowering the 
strands of yarn running forward (the warp), and 
the other for picking, or moving the shuttle that 
carries the crosswise strand (the weft) across the 
warp. A powerloom performs the same opera-
tions mechanically. In an automatic loom the 
shuttles are replaced mechanically when they run 
out of yarn, so that an operator, whose remaining 
task is to mend yarn breaks, can look after more 
looms. 1 n shuttleless looms, the shuttle, which is 
relatively heavy (= 50 g), is replaced by either a 
lighter projectile, a gripper or a rapier, which 
picks up the yarn at one end and drops it at the 
other, or by a jet of air or water. The energy 
consumption is, thereby, reduced and the speed 
increased. 
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Manual spinning and weaving make different 
demands upon workers. The process of twisting 
fibre to produce yarn does not require strength; 
thus spinning was traditionally carried out by 
women. Spinning wheels are light, and workers' 
strength does not set a limit on their output 
(although this may not be true of the new 
multispindle devices such as the Ambar Charkha). 
The rate of manual spinning is limited by the 
worker's speed in turning the wheel and skill in 
controlling the twist and evenness of the yarn. 
The moving of the shuttle on a loom, on the other 
hand, is physically exhausting, thus handweaving 
is generally carried out by men. 
The mechanization of the two processes also 
poses very different problems. Twisting of fibre 
requires a rotary motion, which is easily mechan-
ized by means of shafts connected to prime 
movers. Moving of the shuttle, on the other hand, 
is a lateral motion and, although rotary power 
can be and is converted into lateral motion, there 
is loss of power in the process, and the process 
cannot be speeded up as much as spinning by 
mechanization or as long as the powerloom is a 
close imitation of the handloom. As a result, 
handweaving survived much longer in all coun-
tries than handspinning and productivity in 
mechanized weaving still continues to be lower 
(in terms of yarn woven per man-hour) than in 
spinning (in terms of yarn output per man-hour). 
In India, handspinning died out, for all 
practical purposes, by World War I. if not before. 
Despite its promotion by M.K. Gandhi and 
subsidization by the government after indepen-
dence, it remains quantitatively insignificant. 
Handweaving, however, never died out, and 
continues today, although it probably does not 
account for more than 25% of current yarn 
consumption. 
Government Policy 
The government has discriminated against 
textile mills for over 25 years on the grounds that 
more labour-intensive technology than is being 
used is available and its usage should be 
encouraged. The discrimination takes a number 
of forms. 
(I) The government subsidized the Khadi and 
Village Industries Commission, which organizes 
the production and sale of handspun and 
handwoven cloth. It also buys khadi for the 
uniforms of its lower paid employees. 
(2) In 1956, the government banned the 
installation of new looms by mills. Since that 
time, mills have been allowed to purchase looms 
only for replacement or for export production. 
(3) The government charges excise duties on 
the mills' output of yarn and cloth. The ban on 
new looms in mills and the differential excise 
duties greatly benefited power looms set up 
outside mills to the detriment of handlooms. 
Since 1976, however. excise duties have been 
levied on the processed output of powerlooms as 
well, although not at such high rates as those 
placed upon the mills' output. 
(4) Between 1965 and 1978 the government 
required that a certain proportion of mill output 
should consist of coarse cloth and must be sold 
below a controlled maximum price. The idea was 
to subsidize poorer buyers at the expense of the 
rich. Apart from the losses this scheme imposed 
upon weaker weaving mills, however, neither 
handlooms nor mills taken over by the govern-
ment could face the resulting competition in the 
market for coarse cloth. As a result, the govern-
ment now uses the mills that went bankrupt and 
were subsequently nationalized to make the bulk 
of cheap cloth for sale, and supplements its 
supply by purchasing a small quantity of coarse 
yarn from mills. 
(5) The government has used the industrial 
licencing mechan:sm to encourage cooperative 
spinning mills, which are expected to sell their 
yarn to member weavers. 
Spinning 
Except for the very small amount of cotton 
that is handspun, all yarn is made in large-scale 
textile mills in India. There are two types of mills: 
those that only spin yarn (spinning mills) and 
those that weave it as well (composite mills). The 
latter, as a group, produce more yarn than 
needed for their own cloth manufacturing and 
sell the balance in the market. The yarn supplied 
by spinning and composite mills is bought by 
handloom and powerloom weavers through 
traders or through their own cooperatives 
(Table I). 
Among synthetics, the only yarn that is of 
much significance is viscose rayon, which is 
prized by less-affluent women as a substitute for 
silk and is used in saris and dresses for weddings 
and ceremonies. The demand for rayon has 
always been buoyant. Production is profitable, 
but because there is a domestic shortage of 
pulpwood, a large proportion of the quantity 
consumed is imported. Rayon is woven mainly 
by powerlooms outside textile mills and there is 
an active market for it. 
It has been a standing complaint of the small-
scale sector that composite mills meet their own 
yarn requirements first and sell only the surplus. 
If this were so, the proportion of yarn sold to the 
small-scale sector should have fallen whenever 
there was a yarn shortage, which has not always 
been the case. Given the differential excise duties, 
the wage differentials, and the restrictions on 
technological change in weaving by mills, it 
appears that the small-scale powerloom sector 
has enjoyed a competitive edge over the mills 
(spinning yarn for sale is more profitable than 
weaving, even for composite mills) and the small-
scale sector's complaints of yarn shortage are 
Table I. Cotton yarn supply (thousand tons). 
For cloth production 
Sales to small-scale sector Self-
consumption 
Composite Spinning of composite Nonfabric 
Year mills mills Total mills Total uses Exports Total 
1960 246 516 762 12 II 785 
1965 337 568 905 16 II 932 
1970 406 524 930 15 26 971 
1975 105 333 438 513 951 16 3 970 
1976 104 345 449 523 972 18 15 1005 
1977 96 310 406 411 817 21 12 850 
1978 117 332 449 432 881 23 5 909 
Sources: Indian Cotton Mills Federation (1976); Textile Commissioner ( 1980). 
63 
Table 2. Spinning capacity utilization, 1950-1978. 
Spinning mills Composite mills 
Average Average 
spindles spindles 
Spindles per mill Spindles per mill 
Spindle capacity utilization (%) 
Year Number (• IOl) (• IOl) Number (- IOl) (• IOl) I st shift 2nd shift 3rd shift Average 
1950 94 1860 20 268 8695 32 85.3 75.9 25.4 62.2 
1955 116 1768 IS 292 10189 JS 85.2 79.5 32.I 65.6 
1960 186 2931 16 293 !0619 36 87.0 85.3 44.8 72.4 
1965 2S3 3941 16 290 I 1493 40 86.0 86.6 65.2 79.3 
1970 366 5463 IS 290 12205 42 78.0 78.2 68.4 74.9 
19758 330 6539 20 288 12308 43 72.4 73.2 66.7 70.8 
1976 330 6884 21 288 12406 43 69.0 69.8 63.8 67.5 
1977 338 7404 22 289 12296 43 77.3 78.2 70.9 75.5 
1978 357 7680 22 291 12400 43 80.8 81.8 76.4 79.7 
1979 370 8160 22 291 12520 43 78.8 79.6 78.2 78.9 
•The number of spinning mills from 1975 onward excludes waste spinning mills. 
Sources: Millowners' Association ( 1979): Southern India Mills' Association ( 1980, Tables 11. 19). 
only a reflection of the powerlooms' profitability. 
Nevertheless, these complaints have evoked a 
policy response. In contrast to its freeze on the 
weaving capacity of mills, the government 
liberally sanctioned the expansion of spinning 
capacity (Table 2). In sanctioning such capacity it 
gave preference to spinning mills and particularly 
to spinning mills started by loom cooperatives, of 
which there were 54 by 1978 and another IO 
under construction (Committee on Controls and 
Subsidies 1979). The expansion in spindleage, 
therefore, was accompanied by an increase in the 
number of mills: the average size of a spinning 
mill. however, changed little between 1950 and 
1979. 
This expansion led to competition between 
three sets of mills: old spinning mills. composite 
mills, and new mills. New mills installed ring 
frames of postwar design, which were appreciably 
faster than the prewar models used in old 
spinning mills and composite mills. 
The old mills met the competition in two ways. 
Firstly, they increased multiple-shift production: 
the proportion of spindles in second-shift opera-
tion rose from 76% in 1950 to 87% in 1965, 
whereas the proportion in third-shift operation 
went up even more sharply from 25% to 65% 
during the same period. Thus, by 1965 virtually 
the entire spinning industry was working two 
shifts, and two-thirds of it was working three 
shifts. This high level of capacity utilization was 
not maintained after 1965, however, because the 
cotton supply could no longer keep pace with the 
growth of spindles. In addition to the increased 
capacity of old mills, new mills began to achieve 
equally high levels of capacity utilization. Due to 
the ensuing competition, a number of spinning 
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mills closed down or were taken over by the 
government: there was, however, no decrease in 
multiple-shift operation. 
Secondly, the expansion of spindleage was 
accompanied by investment in cotton prepara-
tions, i.e., blow room machinery, carding engines, 
draw frames, speed frames, and doubling frames. 
Although much of the investment went into new 
spinning mills, old mills also improved their 
processes in two ways: they installed new carding 
engines, including the new Crosrol Varga 
models, to improve the quality of slivers 
(domestic manufacturers' sales of carding 
engines were much in excess of those required by 
new ring frames, approximately three for each 
ring frame) (Table 3) and they installed high-
draft conversion attachments designed to 
increase the speed of draw frames and ring 
frames, which raised their capacity by 10-20%. 
There was, however, one change that did not 
occur. Until 1966, India grew very little long-
staple cotton: what little was used was imported. 
New local hybrids then went into cultivation and 
their output rose so rapidly that they replaced 
imports and supplied nearly a quarter of the 
cotton by 1978 (Table 4). With this change in the 
staple pattern of cotton supply, one would have 
expected a corresponding change in the count 
composition of yarns. The yarn output pattern 
did move toward higher counts, but not nearly as 
much as the shift in the staple composition would 
have permitted. Evidently, the new supplies of 
long-staple cotton were being used to produce 
medium counts. The reason for this was clearly 
related to the demand pattern for cloth. 
Apart from its implications for capital 
utilization, multiple-shift operation enabled mills 
Table 3. Output of textile equipment. 1958-1979. 
Blow- Carding engines High-draft 
room Old Crosrol Draw Speed Doubling Ring conversion systems 
Year lines model Varga Combers frames frames frames frames No. Rs (x !Ol) 
1958 1148 9 28 877 136 4115 
1959 763 40 16 7 1077 210 2400 
1960 I 1075 47 45 156 1127 287 3157 
1961 5 1308 75 70 113 1380 348 5065 
1962 IO 1501 61 45 115 1571 531 7093 
1963 16 1696 52 96 80 1990 526 7469 
1964 15 1938 38 49 140 2134 NA 13120 
1965 17 1808 16 30 134 2308 1831 29434 
1966 16 1809 26 68 174 1507 1240 18542 
1967 22 432 148 112 90 97 1256 555 13042 
1968 9 172 247 164 44 86 813 570 12788 
1969 14 296 465 223 87 154 880 NA 16237 
1970 16 381 600 255 132 198 1357 NA 20699 
1971 15 317 401 332 129 212 1161 NA 21453 
1972 15 171 222 2 297 129 84 885 NA 21607 
1973 20 436 46 36 258 125 123 1225 NA 31737 
1974-75' 31 556 669 60 496 214 98 1795 NA 69337 
1975-76 31 532 226 59 480 309 73 1598 NA 51089 
1976-77 28 524 455 66 502 407 185 1436 NA 61558 
197778 33 259 499 41 370 259 249 1356 NA 45997 
1978 79 38 372 566 59 572 366 195 1661 NA 93743 
NOTE: NA = not available. 
"Financial years (April-March) from this time onward. 
Sources: Textile Machinery Manufacturers' Association (1961: 1965: 1970: 1971: 1975: 1979: 1980). 
Tahle 4. Staple length composition of mills' cotton consumption. 
Staple 
Consumption by weight (thousand tons) Consumption by percentage length 
(mm) 1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 
~27 
Foreign 178.65 136.62 128.52 33.15 92.82 19.31 11.91 11.21 2.74 8.25 
Indian 18.20 249.56 280.50 1.57 20.65 24.94 
24.5-26 144.89 154.98 153.34 90.78 115.77 15.66 13.51 13.37 7.51 10.29 
22-24 274.03 616.14 430.27 432.14 351.05 29.63 53.72 37.51 35.75 31.22 
20-21.5 288.55 174.24 298.01 244.46 163.54 24.71 15.19 25.98 20.23 14.54 
.:;;19 98.66 64.80 118.66 158.61 120.53 10.67 5.65 10.34 13.12 10.72 
Sources: Textile Commissioner ( 1960: 1972): Indian Cotton Mills Federation (1973: 1976): Millowners' Association (1979). 
to improve labour productivity in two ways: (I) 
some of the surplus workers could be transferred 
to the second and third shifts and (2) because 
workers were not as readily available for the 
night shift. lower manning levels were accepted 
for it (the number of spindles per worker was 79 
in the first shift and 117 in the third shift in 1960: 
by 1979. it had risen to 117 in the first shift and 
181 in the third (Textile Commissioner 1962: 
Southern Indian Mills' Association 1980)). 
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Weaving 
According to the latest figures published by the 
Textile Commissioner. the number of hand looms 
covered by cooperatives was 1.4 million in 1969 
(Textile Commissioner 1972). Their capacity 
(estimated at 5 m/day. 300 days per year) should 
be 2.1 x l 09 m. or nearly 60% of the small-scale 
sector's output in that year. However. their 
capacity utilirntion is poor. their capital costs are 
low, and so are the wages of hand loom weavers. 
As a result, when alternative employment offers 
better wages, weavers take up outside work. It is 
doubtful if more than 30% of small-scale produc-
tion is woven on handlooms. 
The important competing groups, therefore, 
are composite mills and powerlooms in the small-
scale sector. This competition has been regulated 
by the government by means of differential excise 
duties. Powerlooms were untaxed until 1955, at 
which time a duty was introduced at rates of 
Rs25, 75, and 150 per loom on units with 5-24, 
24-49, and more than 50 looms respectively. Jn 
practice, however, larger units evaded duty by 
dispersing looms in a number of sites until the 
exemption given to units with 1-4 looms was 
removed in 1965 (M illowners' Association 1979). 
In 1976, this loom duty was replaced by duties on 
processed cloth from handlooms and power-
looms, which amounted to 30 and 70%, 
respectively, of the duties paid by mills; 
handloom cooperatives, however, continued to 
be exempt (Millowners' Association 1979). Jn 
order to evade the duty, however, a great many 
looms operated without the licence, from the 
Textile Commissioner, that they required. 
Mill production was almost free of excise until 
I 949; there was only a 25% duty on superfine 
cloth. In I 949, small revenue duties were imposed 
on all cloth, which increased with its fineness. Jn 
1953, a punitive duty was imposed on dhotis 
produced by mills iftheir output exceeded 60% of 
the output in the financial year I 953-1954. The 
discrimination was so strong that mills, for the 
most part, gave up dhoti production to small-
scale industry. 
Revenue duties began to rise in 1956, when the 
government's budgetary demands started in-
creasing in order to finance the Second Five-Year 
Plan. Jn 1958, a system was introduced that 
lasted until 1977, under which the rates increased 
with the fineness, as well as the degree, of 
processing. In I 977, this system was replaced by 
one under which the duty increased with the price 
of the cloth, except for fine and superfine cloth, 
which bore the highest duty regardless of its 
price. 
This differential taxation had two effects: 
(I) It discouraged the production offinercloth. 
Fiscal discrimination explains the fact that the 
pattern of yarn output did not move toward finer 
counts nearly as much as the pattern of cotton 
consumption moved toward long-staple fibres. 
In the 1970s, spinning mills were producing 
coarser yarn than necessary with the available 
cotton because at postduty cloth prices there was 
not enough demand for fine cloth. 
An incidental effect of this shift in the output 
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pattern was that less cloth was produced. 
Although I kg of yarn (of the appropriate count) 
produces about the same length of superior 
medium or fine cloth, it produces 50-60% more 
superfine cloth. Thus, the use of cotton, which 
could have produced superfine cloth, to make 
less fine cloth resulted in a commensurate loss of 
output. If the long-staple fibre, constituting 
approximately one-quarter of the total con-
sumption by the late 1970s, had been used to 
make superfine cloth, it would have added 
12-15% to aggregate cloth production. This is an 
overestimate, however, because it is not evident 
that all the cotton could have produced superfine 
cloth and because such a large increase in 
superfine cloth output might not have been 
absorbed by the market despite the lower prices 
that lower excise duties would have permitted. 
The possibility of substitution, on the other hand, 
makes the demand for varieties of cloth highly 
price-elastic. It is possible to argue, therefore, 
that less strongly progressive excise duties would 
have brought about a better balance between the 
pattern of cotton supply and the pattern of 
demand for cloth. This may not be equally true 
today, however, because, since I 977, the degree of 
progression has been reduced and the maximum 
duty on unprocessed cloth is now 15o/c. The 
continuing duty on fine and superfine cloth, 
regardless of its price, is clearly capable of 
influencing the production pattern in the same 
way as before 1977. Virtually all fine and 
superfine cloth is processed further and, there-
fore, bears additional processing duties. 
(2) The duties diverted production to 
powerlooms, and the diversion was greater in the 
case of fine fabrics, which were more heavily 
taxed. It was commonly believed that fine cloth 
was a preserve of the mill industry and that the 
small-scale sector concentrated on coarse cloth. 
In general, the small-scale sector produced a 
larger proportion of coarse cloth. This is particu-
larly the case with hand looms. The time required 
on the loom per metre increases with the fineness 
of the cloth and so, therefore, does the weaving 
cost per metre. Because handlooms are much 
slower than powerlooms (50 times slower accord-
ing to Bruce ( 1977)), the cost difference between 
fine and coarse handloom cloth is greater than 
with powerloom cloth. Because fine cloth takes 
longer to weave on a handloom, inventory costs 
are also higher. Although handlooms specialize 
in coarse cloth (and fabrics with complicated 
weaving patterns that require longer loom setup 
times), there is no reason for powerlooms to do 
so. They are plain looms, but they are no less 
efficient than plain looms in mills; if anything, 
they are newer on the average (although mills 
have not been allowed to increase their loomage 
since 1956 and have largely been operating with 
prewar looms, most of the powerlooms of the 
small-scale sector were acquired in the 1950s and 
1960s). Mills have been allowed to acquire some 
automatic looms or to replace plain looms with 
automatic looms, but such acquisitions have 
been allowed only for exports and are confined to 
a small number of mills; thus, the overall 
proportion of automatic looms remains small. 
Although concentrating on coarse dhotis and 
saris, powerlooms have increasingly ventured 
into the production of fine cloth. In 1960, 
powerlooms consumed about the same quantity 
of yarn with a count of 41 and above as mills and 
in 1970 they consumed more than twice as much 
as consumed by mills. The entire increase in fine 
yarn output between 1960 and 1970 went to 
powerlooms (Table 5). 
Weaving mills countered the competition of 
powerlooms in three ways: 
(1) They increased the capacity utilization of 
looms by increasing third-shift operation, which 
rose from IO% in 1950 to 66% in 1979. Thus, 
virtually all looms were working two shifts and 
two-thirds of them three shifts by 1979 (Textile 
Commissioner 1962; Tables 13, 19). As with 
spinning, the rise in capacity utilization coincided 
with and contributed to the increase in the 
number of looms per worker, which rose from 
1.27 in 1960 to 1.86 in 1979. 
(2) The mills increased the number of picks per 
metre of cloth and wove more closely (cf. Mohota 
1976), thus weaving stronger and more durable 
cloth. The metres woven per kilogram decreased 
throughout the 1960s, more so for fine cloth 
(Table 6). (Two other possibilities for this 
decrease, i.e., understatement of output and 
increase in width, may be ruled out. The incentive 
for both would be evasion of excise duty, but if 
output had been understated in metres, it would 
have been understated in terms of weight also, 
leaving their ratio unchanged. Also, an increase 
in breadth would not have reduced the incidence 
of the duty, whose base was changed from linear 
to square metres in 1955. Part of the increase in 
weight (less than 10%), however, is explained by 
the wider application of preshrinking processes 
such as mercerizing and Sanforizing.) The re-
sulting impact occurred as a fall in per capita 
cloth consumption in the early 1970s. 
(3) The mills began to process an increasing 
proportion of their cloth. Preshrinking proces-
ses, which were virtually unknown in the 1950s, 
were applied to over half of the output by 1979 
(Table 7). An increasing proportion of the cloth 
Table 5. Count composition of yarn consumed. 
Count 1960 1965 1970 1975 1976 
Se(f-consumption by weavin1r mills (thousand tons) 
1--20 216.9 248.0 204.6 177.5 212.7 
21-30 206.5 224.2 210.8 194.7 179.6 
31-40 91.6 98.3 106.9 107.1 97.4 
41 and above 27.2 32.0 38.5 33.7 32.9 
Deliveries to handlooms and powerlooms (thousand tons) 
1-20 120.3 155.6 177.2 206.0 204.6 
21-30 49.8 66.9 73.3 65.8 68.2 
31-40 42.0 54.5 75.0 80.7 91.5 
41 and above 33.6 59.8 81.1 85.2 84.9 
Sources: Textile Commissioner (1962; 1973; 1980). 
















































was dyed or printed. Printing used to be, and to a 
considerable extent still is, a manual process in 
India, geared to short production runs and often 
custom-made orders. Mills began to compete 
with handprinters; in this venture they were 
helped by the advent of new azo dyes, in 
attractive colours, and by rotary screen printing 
machines, which brought flexibility into printing. 
Not all cloth mills adopted these innovations. 
Those that lagged behind were driven into 
bankruptcy. One hundred and eleven mills, the 
majority being composite mills, went bankrupt in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s and were, 
subsequently, nationali7ed. Those that improved 
their technology emerged with a product that was 
clearly differentiated from that of powerlooms in 
durability, quality, and finish and that could, 
therefore, bear the higher duties. Many of these 
mills started, or expanded, their own retail shop 
networks, advertised their textiles, and built up a 
brand image. Weaving mills as a group, however, 
continued to lose ground. Even the sharp 
increase in the supply of synthetic fibres after 
1975, in whose blending and utilization com-
posite mills had a certain lead, did not reverse the 
continuing decline in their market share (Table 8). 
Textile Machinery and Embodied 
Technological Change 
Textile technology has progressed rapidly 
since World War II. There have been two major 
inventions: open-end spinning and shuttleless 
weaving. Furthermore, all processes have been 
greatly speeded up. Labour time required per 
kilogram of yarn has fallen from l 0 min in 1959 
to 2-3 min on ring frames and l-2 min on open-
end spinners. In weaving, labour productivity has 
risen from 63 000 weft-metres per hour in 1959 to 
383 000 weft-metres per hour. Output of cotton 
Table 7. Processing of cloth by mills, 1960-1979.• 
Process 1960 1965 1970 1975 
Total mill output 4238 4267 
Bleached 1784 1736 1799 1807 
Dyed 750 890 1228 1264 
Printed 590 777 J088 1134 
Mercerized 63 713 811 744 
Sanforized 43 323 430 314 
Other chemical processes NA 49 JOO 76 
Total cloth processedb 3230 4488 5456 5339 
a All values in million metres. 
bTotal cloth processed exceeds total mill output because some of the cloth undergoes multiple processing. 
Sources: Indian Cotton Mills Federation (1976; 1980): Textile Commissioner (1980). 
Table 8. Output of cloth by fibre and blend, 1960-1979.• 
1960 1965 1970 
Mills' output 
Cotton 4616 4587 4157 
Viscose and other synthetics 3 4 I 
Cotton-viscose NA NA 17 
Cotton-polyester NA NA 53 
Other blends NA NA JO 
Small-scale sector's output 
Cotton 2013 3056 3692 
Syntheticsb 544 866 932 
Blends NA NA 55' 
a All values in million metres. 
b Almost entirely Viscose rayon. 
'Estimated from yarn consumption by applying the mill ratio of number of metres to weight. 






























per card has risen from 8 kg/ h in 1960 to 
80- 120 kg/h. Drawing frames have increased 
their speed from 90 m/ min in 1960 to 600 m/ min. 
ring frames from 12 000 rpm to 18 000 rpm. and 
looms from 40 000 weft-metres per hour to 65 000 
weft-metres per hour. Thus. every type of 
machinery has been speeded up with a conse-
quent saving in labour and space (Hartmann 1980). 
This rapid technological change has been 
engineered by a textile machinery industry with 
its centre in continental Europe. The open-end 
spinner was an invention of lnvesta. a C7echoslo-
vakian firm. whereas the first shuttleless loom 
was made by Sul1er. a Swiss firm. Swiss and 
German firms are technological leaders. but the 
flow of information among the leading firms 
throughout the world - chiefly German. Swiss. 
French. and Italian. with a sprinkling of American 
and Japanese firms -- through fairs. meetings. 
and journals is extremely rapid. There is con-
siderable cross-licencing and imitation. and no 
invention remains exclusive to the originating 
firm for long. Most of the firms are small by 
European standards. production runs are short. 
quite a few retain an old family tradition of 
craftsmanship. and most specialize in a limited 
range of equipment. Large firms. which can set 
up turnkey textile mills. are scarce. 
European firms are located in old textile 
centres - Saxony. Alsace-Lorraine. Basel, the 
Rhone valley. Milan - some of which have since 
declined. They continue to respond to the needs 
of the local textile industry. The spectacular 
increases in the speed of new equipment and the 
labour productivity achievable with it have been 
a reaction to the loss of manpower by and the rise 
of wages in the European textile industry during 
the postwar years. This depressed industry has 
not been a good customer for machinery. and 
many of the textile equipment manufacturers 
have diversified into other types of machinery. 
They are less speciali1ed in textile machinery now 
than during the 1960s. and what characteri1es 
them today is their pool of engineering and 
chemical talents. which are put to use in designing 
new machinery and processes. Knowledge of this 
nature has never existed in India. nor does it exist 
now. 
The origin of the Indian textile machinery 
industry can be found in three types of firms: (I) 
Repair and service specialists. A small number of 
firms started as repairers of equipment and 
graduated to the fabrication of parts and. later. 
equipment. (2) Stores importers and manufac-
turers. There are numerous wearing parts of 
textile machinery that require frequent replace-
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ment. such as spindles. shuttles. healds. reeds. 
bobbins. and pricking sticks. There was a 
shortage of these items during the war and their 
makeshift manufacture was taken up. The num-
ber of stores manufacturers has always been 
considerable. (3) Confederates of foreign manu-
facturers. There are few in this industry. All 
confederates began business after blanket import 
substitution started in 1957. 
In the years following World War II. a large 
number of textile machines and accessories were 
being made by the first two types of firms: but 
they were making what were essentially prewar 
British models. and the orders they filled were 
mainly small replacement orders. New mills and 
mills taking up major reequipment programs still 
placed their large orders abroad. They did so. 
basically. because they trusted foreign brand 
names more. but the assumption behind this 
preference. that they would get a more standard-
ized. more reliable machine than at home. was. 
perhaps. not without substance. 
The situation changed after 1956. The sudden 
rise in imports wiped out the sterling reserves 
built up during the war and led the government to 
impose stringent quantitative restrictions on 
imports. The principle behind these restrictions 
was that if an item was being produced in India it 
could not be imported unless its Indian manu-
facturer could not supply it. 
The import restrictions gave Indian manu-
facturers control of the entire Indian market if 
they could supply it with goods. Supplying it did 
not require much manufacturing during the early 
stages because liberal imports of components 
were initially allowed to be phased down in later 
years. There was. however. a boom in the textile 
industry. and the market for textile machinery 
was growing. To exploit it. a manufacturer had to 
be able to increase supplies rapidly. It also helped 
if the manufacturer could cater to the buyer's 
preference for a foreign brand name. The result 
was an enormous increase in the number of 
technology-import agreements (Textile Machin-
ery Manufacturers' Association 1961 ). 
It should be noted that the machinery manu-
facturers imported technology not because they 
had none. as was the case in a number of other 
industries. but because they could not otherwise 
have raised production fast enough or supplied as 
good machinery. There was considerable repeti-
tive importing of technology. Not only was 
technology imported to produce machinery that 
was already being produced within the country. 
but manufacturers also imported technology for 
goods they were already manufacturing. In each 
case. the manufacturers imported technology not 
to acquire a foreign name but to improve their 
own technology. Thus, the late 1950s saw a 
radical updating of textile technology and in 1965 
the gap between Indian and foreign technology 
was narrower than ever before or after. 
Three-quarters of the early technology import 
agreements were with firms in West Germany 
and Japan (Textile Machinery Manufacturers' 
Association 1961 ). Generally speaking, finishing 
processes, involved in product differentiation for 
the market, are operated on a smaller scale than 
the preparatory stages, i.e., spinning and weav-
ing. Hence, a larger number of firms produce 
finishing machinery. 
If what is known about technology imports 
into India applies to the textile machinery 
industry, it was not foreign machinery producers 
who sought to sell technology but Indian 
manufacturers who went looking for technology 
abroad. If so, the question arises: Why did they 
go to West Germany and Japan? Why did they 
not go, for instance, to Britain, which had, until 
then, been the prime source of textile machinery 
for India? It is impossible to answer this question 
with any accuracy 20 years after the event, but the 
answer probably is that technology from Britain 
was not readily available. The British textile 
machinery industry was more concentrated than 
on the continent and in Japan and it had its 
contacts with the Indian textile industry through 
import agencies in Bombay and Calcutta. Antici-
pating more restrictive import policies, Indian 
textile mills placed large orders for machinery 
with them in the late 1950s. Hence, it is likely that 
British firms failed to anticipate the tremendous 
advantage accorded to firms based in India by the 
new import policy and, therefore, to cash in on 
the Indian demand for technology. 
The role of market structure on the supply of 
technology is worth stressing. Swit?erland, for 
example, has a small number of large equipment 
manufacturers that, in the absence of an exten-
sive domestic market, export a high proportion 
of their output. Technological superiority is an 
important selling point for them in the world 
market. These firms are, basically, exporters and 
will sell technology only when such sales would 
not conflict with their exports, i.e., when the 
technology sold is of an earlier generation or 
when the technology is accompanied by invest-
ment and, therefore, adds to the sales of the 
group. 
In West Germany, on the other hand, there are 
a large number of firms, many of which are small, 
with a largely domestic or at most European 
market. For them, there is no conflict between 
their own sales and the sale of technology, 
particularly to a distant country that is unlikely 
70 
to export machinery to Europe. Even then, of the 
West German firms that exhibit novel machines 
in the International Textile Machinery Exhibi-
tion, it is remarkable to note that only 5, ofa total 
of about 20, have sold technology to India. 
It may be argued that this is because there is 
little demand for advanced technology in India. 
This is true to some extent but Indian manu-
facturers have, generally, been quite aware of 
major innovations abroad and quick to take 
licences. The reason is that, because the textile 
industry is not a priority industry, equipment 
imports continue to be restricted on the basis of 
domestic capacity. A machinery manufacturer 
can secure the Indian market against imports, for 
a machine, at least for a time, by simply signing a 
technology import agreement. If the market 
develops, the return on the cost of the technology 
is high; if it does not, all that the technology 
importer loses is the initial payment. Technology 
imports are used to restrict potential competition 
from product imports just as industrial licences 
are used to restrict potential competition within 
the country. 
Under the circumstances, technology import 
agreements have a speculative use; ifthe domestic 
market does not grow or the prospective tech-
nology importer does not have the capacity to 
exploit it, there is no need to import the 
technology. Often the prospective technology 
importer takes a licence from the technology 
supplier and then waits until a market develops 
for the product. 
Between 1955 and 1965 the risk of going into 
production was less because the textile industry 
was expanding and, at least during the initial 
stages, manufacturers received such liberal im-
port licences that they had to manufacture (or 
procure within the country) very little: the 
business was similar to assembling imported 
components and not much different from direct 
importing. A number of manufacturers held 
import agencies for some products and licences 
to produce others, and converted one into the 
other if the market seemed likely to expand 
steadily. 
During the 1960s, however, as India's foreign 
exchange resources continued to fall short of 
industry's requirements, import licences were 
cut, more and more components had to be 
produced within the country, production and 
procurement became increasingly difficult, and 
equipment prices were progressively raised to 
maintain profit margins. This cost and price 
escalation continued until 1965. In that year, the 
cotton crop was poor, cotton prices rose sharply, 
a drought reduced rural demand for textiles, and 
the textile industry went into a slump. Despite 
liberal credits given by the Industrial Develop-
ment Bank of India for machinery purchases, the 
sales of textile equipment fell drastically. The 
firms that withstood the depression best were 
those that had specialized in high-wear items 
such as bearings, top arms, spindle inserts, and 
fluted rollers. 
Conclusions 
The promotion of small-scale production has 
been and continues to be an important element of 
Indian ideology and government policy. The 
means adopted to promote it in the textile 
industry consisted of discrimination in taxation 
and licencing against large mills and subsidies to 
small industry through the Khadi and Village 
Industries Commission and through coopera-
tives. On the whole, these policies have had little 
success in changing the technology mix, but they 
have had a strong influence, quite unrelated to 
policy objectives, on firm size and composition. 
They have prevented the growth of composite 
mills and have led to the installation of most of 
the new looms in extremely small enterprises. 
Furthermore, they have had a number of 
unintended and, indeed, little-noticed effects. 
Under pressures created by them, the mill 
industry has improved its capital utili7ation and 
the quality of its product, and endeavoured to 
meet the competition presented by powerlooms 
by means of product differentiation. It has met 
the competition of new enterprises with new and 
better equipment by means of small improve-
ments in technology and product, which have 
cumulatively added up to a substantial change. 
At the same time, however, it has produced less 
fine yarn than cotton supplies permitted, and, 
thereby, reduced national cloth output below its 
potential. 
The developments within the textile industry 
have dictated the shape of the textile machinery 
industry. The small. new spinning mills and the 
even smaller weaving sheds have created a 
demand for cheap, simple, and sturdy spinning 
and weaving equipment. The improvements in 
the mills have required ancillary equipment such 
as high-draft systems, carding engines, and 
finishing machines and the increase in frame 
speeds has raised the demand for high-wear 
goods such as bearings. Hence, the textile 
machinery industry has based its foundation on 
ancillary equipment and items that wear. Al-
Comments: Jamal Ahad Khan 
So.far, discussion has centred on the import of 
technology and its subsequent absorption, assim-
71 
though well aware of innovations being made 
a broad in the chief processes, the industry has, 
after having had problems with automatic looms 
in the I 960s, tended to specialize in old and tested 
equipment, waiting to bring in new technology 
until the domestic market clearly calls for it. 
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ilation, and d!ffusion within related industries. 
In some of the papers the question ofgovernment 
regulations and market came up as a side issue. 
However, this paper deals primarily with govern-
ment regulations and their effect on the tech-
nology of the country directly or through market 
forces. This topic is of considerable importance 
because government regulations and market 
forces play a dominant role in the technology 
of any country. 
The paper deals with thefollowing government 
regulations: (J) support of the nonmill sector 
against the mill sector through the imposition of 
excise duty on the mill sector, subsidy of the 
nonmill sector, and provision of a market to the 
khadi and village industries; (2) support of the 
small-scale powerloom sector through an in-
dustrial licencing mechanism to encourage co-
operative spinning mills; and (3) a ban on the 
import of machinery that could be manufactured 
locally. 
From figures within the paper it is evident that: 
(1) the number of spindles installed increased 
with time; (2) spindle capacity utilization showed 
some fluctuations but an improvement, neverthe-
less, over the year 1950; (3) cotton consumption 
increased within the mill sector; (4) the increased 
use of cotton was mainly for finer counts of yarn; 
(5) labour utilization within the spinning sector 
rose over the year 1960; (6)yarn consumption (by 
weight) decreased within the mill sector but 
increased within the small-scale sector; (7) loom 
capacity utilization within the mill sector in-
creased; (8) the amount of processed cloth 
increased within the mill sector; and (9) the 
number of technology import agreements in 
textile machinery mushroomed between 1961 
and 1975. 
The conclusion drawn is that the mill industry 
has improved its capital utilization; however, 
Table 2 shows that capacity utilization dropped 
from 74.9% in 1970to 70.8% in 1975 and67.5% in 
1976. How much of the increase to 79.7% in 1978 
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was a result of an increase in the local textile 
market due to (1) reduction of imports; (2) 
reduction in price and, therefore, increase in total 
market; (3) growth in population; and (4) 
increase in per capita income compared with (1) 
improvement in the quality of cloth produced by 
the mill sector and consequent product dif-
ferentiation; (2) restriction on expansion of mill 
weaving capacity; and (3) increase in exports? 
Without these answers the observation appears 
quite biased. 
The paper states that the power/ooms em-
ployed in the small-scale sector "are plain looms, 
but they are no less efficient than plain looms in 
mills; if anything, they are newer on the average 
(although mills have not been allowed to increase 
their loomage since 1956 and have largely been 
operating with prewar looms, most of the power-
looms of the small-scale sector were acquired in 
the 1950s and 1960s)." If this is true and other 
conditions remain the same, the power/ooms 
should have been able to compete with the mill 
sector even in the manufacture of fine cloth. In 
fact, the study states that the "powerlooms have 
increasingly ventured into the production of fine 
cloth." Under the circumstances, the reasons why 
the mill weaving sector, with higher overheads 
and excise duty, has not been driven out of 
business have not been detailed. 
The aspect of transfer of technology has been 
clearly identified through government sanctions 
against imported products that could be pro-
duced locally by increasing the import of tech-
nology through licencing. The paper, however, 
would have been much improved if it had also 
covered the role of the government regarding 
import vis-a-vis selection of source, contractual 
agreements, royalty payments, market restric-
tions, and restrictions on diffusion of know-how. 
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